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Liquidity constraints and, more generally, imperfections in credit markets, can be
extremely important for the interteinporal allocation of consumption and have received a
substantial amount of attention in the theoretical and empirical literature on consumption. In the
first part of the paper I review the reasons why liquidity constraints are important.
Unfortunately, for several reasons, it is not easy to test for the presence of liquidity
constraints. Aggregation issues preclude the use of aggregate time series data for such a purpose.
Tests based on micro data, however, are complicated by some serious identification problems.
If a simple equilibriummodeldoes not fit some data set, one can change the assumptions about
the opportunity set available to the economic agents or the specification of their preferences. For
instance, empirical evidencethatdetects excess sensitivity of consumption to income could be
explained by liquidity constraints or by non separability between consumption and leisure.
However, the available evidence shows that it is possible to find flexible specifications of
preferences that fit consumption movements at business cycle frequencies. I also present some
simulation evidence that shows that for many plausible parameter configurations, liquidity
consuaints are likely to be relevant only for a small proportion of economic agents.
In the last part of the paper I present some new evidence on the relevance of liquidity
constraints based on debt holding data. The data indicate that the demand for debt of individuals






The determinants of aggregate and individual consumption have always attracted a consider-
able amount of attention. While from a theoretical point of view the life cycle model constitutes
the most appealing and flexible framework to study consumption, there is no widespread agreement
among economists on the empirical relevance of the model. Yet, establishing whether the life cycle
model represents a reasonable approximation of consumer behavior and which, if any, mod ifica-
tions to the simplest version of the model need to be considered to fit the available evidence is of
crucial importance for a number of important policy issues.
The two crucial elements in the analysis of consumption (as in most models of economic be-
havior) are thecharacterizationof agents' preferences and of their opportunity set. The life cycle
model sets consumers in a dynamic framework andprovidesthe applied researcherwithanempty
box which should be filled with appropriate assumptions about preferences, expectations forma-
tions and so on. While rational expectations and expected utility maximization have become the
standard paradigm, no consensus has emerged about the preference specifications that are neces-
sary to fit observed behavior. Several issues, including intertemporal separability of preferences,
aggregation across commodities, (non) separability between consumption and leisure, the effect
of changing family composition on preferences, unobserved heterogeneity, and so on, have to be
tackled.
The opportunity set available to consumers and in particular the kind of assets they can
use to allocate resources over time has been a matter of considerable controversy. A wide range
of hypotheses can be found in the literature. On one extreme, some economists have assumed
the existence of perfect insurance markets which allow all consumers in the economy to diversify
idiosyncratic risk completely by writing perfect contingent contracts. This hypothesis is attractive
from a theoretical point of view for a number of reasons and has recently received a considerable
amount of attention from empirical researchers. On the other extreme, consumers are assumed to
be liquidity constrained in that they cannot hold negative amounts on any assets and therefore
cannot borrow against future resources.
In this paper I argue that, from an empirical point of view, it is extremely difficult to sepa-
rate the specification of preferences from the specification of the opportunity set available to an
individual. Furthermore, I argue that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to test hypotheses
about the assets available to an individual using either micro- or macro- economic data. One needs
Iextremely strong and untestable identification assumptions and extremely rich data sets to be able
to say anything on these issues. These considerations apply both to tests of the perfect Insurance
hypothesis and to test of the liquidity constraints hypothesis.'
The message of this paper is not completely negative, however. I argue that with enough
identifying assumptions one can use available data sources to establish the plausibility of different
market structures. The exercise I propose is not completely vacuous in that to fit the available
data, one might be forced to make a number of more or less unrealistic assumptions which may
lead the researcher to disregard the model under study for policy analysis. On the other hand,
one might be able to fit the available data with reasonable assumptions about preferences and
opportunity sets and, at the same time, obtain plausible values for the structural parameters.
Under these circumstances, the theoretical model constitutes a useful framework to characterize
and describe the data and is potentially useful for policy analysis. In addition, given an assumed
market structure and estimated preference parameters, one can establish to what extent certain
constraints are likely to be binding.
As stressed above, these problems are relevant for both the perfect insurance and the liquidity
constraints paradigm. In what follows, however, I focus on the literature on liquidity constraints.
I consider different versions and different implications of the hypothesis and discuss part of the
available eyidence. In the final section of the paper, I present and discuss some new evidence, I
argue that even with detailed data on asset holdings, finance charges, consumption, labor supply
and income, it is difficult to distinguish between different hypotheses.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next Section,! define liquidity constraints
and discuss their importance and their implications within the framework of a general intertemporal
optimization model. In the following Section, ! discuss what can be learned about the presence
of liquidity constraints from aggregate time series data. I the pose the same question for micro
data. Finally, I present a new test for the presence of liquidity constraints which uses uses data on
vehicle loans. The paper ends with some general considerations.
Liquidity constraints theory
In this section, I define what is meant by liquidity constraints and discuss their importance. I
This argument is related to the discussion in Heckman and MaCurdy (1988) on the ob-
servational equivalence of equilibrium and 1disequiibrium' labor market outcomes. However, my
characterization of the problem is not as negative as theirs.
2present a fairly general intertemporal model which can be used to sketch some potentially testable
implications of liquidity constraints.
Whatis itmeantbyliquidity constraints?
In this paper, I consider two possible definitions of liquidity constraints.2 According to the
first, an individual or a household is unable, for whatever reason, to borrow against future earnings
beyond a certain limit (which can be positive or zero).3 In general, the limit itself can be endoge-
nous.' As a consequence1 the first- order condition which describes the intertemporal allocation of
consumption typically relates the expected marginal utility of consumption in two different time
periods to the relative price of consumption, does not hold as an equality iftherestriction is
binding.
The second definition is weaker and considers as liquidity constrained individuals who face a
difference between borrowing and lending interest rates or, more generally, individuals for whom
interest rates are not independent of their net asset position.
In this case, the expected value of the discounted marginal utility of wealth is equal to the
current marginal utility of wealth for all those consumers with non- zero net assets. However, the
interest rate used to discount future marginal utility is the borrowing rate for borrowers and the
lending rate for lenders. Only for those individual with a zero net position does the first order
condition hold as an inequality. More generally, if the rate depends in a continuous fashion on
the net asset position, the intertemporal first order condition will have to take into account these
effects explicitely. 6
Thesituation is even more complicated if one considers the possibility of borrowing against a
lumpy investment (house, automobile) whose services are obtained slowly over time or one considers
assets which provide liquidity services. In these cases, as discussed by Juster and Shay (1964), there
2Iwill not discuss the motivation for the existence of liquidity constraints. The standard
argument for the presence of rational liquidity constraints on the supply side appeals to asy metric
information and adverse selection problems. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
Indeed if one considers institutional saving such as social security contributions, it might even
be negative.
See Alessie et at (1989) and Weber (1993).
See, for instance, Pissarides (1978) and Altonji and Siow (1987). Obviously, one can obtain
the former definition from the latter if one lets the borrowing interest rate at the borrowing limit
go to infinity.
6Ifwe introduce a limit to the amount one can borrow at any rate, all individuals borrowing
the limit will be characterized by a slack condition.
3might be several kinks in the intertemporal budget constraint.
Fixed costs on some asset transactions might also be considered as liquidity constraints. Access
to some forms of wealth can be extremely costly (housing wealth) or even impossible before a certain
age (pension wealth) '.
Thepresence of liquidity constraints has been appealed to as a possible explanation of the
observed correlation between expected consumption and income. Indeed, in many empirical pa-
pen the hypothesis of liquidity constraints has been tested by looking at such a correlation. It
is therefore worth stressing that, under rational behavior, there is no general presumption that
households facing liquidity constraints consume their current labor income and that an increase in
disposable income would be entirely reflected in an increase in consumption. For this to be true,
these constraints must be binding; individuals must be at a corner. Under the first definition this
means that individuals must want to consume more than what they earn and must have run down
their net asset positions. Under the second definition, individuals must hold a zero asset position.
Only under these conditions will liquidity constrained individuals consume their current disposable
income.
This does not mean, however, that if liquidity constraints are not binding consumption be-
havior is unaffected. Indeed, as Hayashi (1987) clearly argues, the expectation of a future binding
liquidity constraint with a zero borrowing limit is equivalent to a shortening of the planning horizon
of the consumer. These effects, however, cancel out when we consider first differences of discounted
marginal utilities, except in those periods in which the constraint is actually binding. This seri-
ously limits, as stressed by Deaton (1992), the ability to detect the presence of tiquidity constraints
using the Euler equations which characterize the intertemporal allocation of consumption.
To derive the behavioral implications of the presence of liquidity constraints and to discuss
possible tests of this hypothesis, it is useful to consider a general and flexible model of intertemporal
optimization. It is to this that I turn now.
A flexible dynamic model of consumption
In this subsection, I introduce a flexible dynamic optimization model which can be used to
See also Jacliman and Sutton (1982).
For the discussion at hand, however, the kind of liquidity constraints discussed above are more
important. Even though some assets might be affected by transaction costs, the Euler equation
for those that are not holds as an equality in the absence of liquidity constraints.
• In both case the increase in income should not beas large as to change them into net savers.
4sketch some of the implications of the two deftnitions of liquidity constraints given above. Consider
thefollowingoptimization problem for a generic household. '°
(1) MazE &i.
(2)E = +1+1w1+1 — — pk+1c1k+1+ +
(3) K+1+1=(1 — 8)K+1+
(4) 1.>O s=1,2
wherec is non durable consumption, j1andP are the husband's and wife's labor supplies, it"
andit'2arethe respective real wage, K and c are the stock and expenditure on durables, pSV is
the price of durables, A and 1?' are the stock and the (ex-post) real interest rate on the i-tb of
N available assets and Z is a vector of variables which affect preferences. The function ()can
be interpreted as a discount factor. The price of non durable consumption is normalized to unity.
For notational simplicity, all quantities are real so that we do not have to worry about inflation.
Preferences are assumed to be intertemporally separable; the within period utility function depends
on consumption of non- durables, the services of durables and leisure, possibly in a non separable
fashion. The household can invest or (in the absence of liquidity constraints of the first type)
borrow in N different assets. The interest rate on asset I is time varying. Equation (2) is the
intertemporal budget constraint. Equation (3) describes the process of accumulation of the stock
of durables which are assumed to depreciate at a constant rate 6. Equation (4)statesthat labor
supply cannot be negative ".
MaCurdy(1981) considers a very general model which also allows for human capital accu-
mulation and taxes, both of which I ignore here. The model can a3so be generalized in other ways.
For instance, one can make interest rates a function of the net asset position or introduce multiple
non durable and durable commodities.
Consumption and leisure hours also have to be positive. It is usually assumed that preferences
are such that these constraints are never binding. Such an assumption is not plausible for durable
consumption; therefore, it would be desirable to consider the possibility of a corner solution in the
stock of durables.
5if one ignores the possibility of liquidity constraints, one canderive,for each of the N assets, N





Similarconditions can be derived in terms of the marginal utility of an additional unit of
durable stock, the only complication being that these marginal utilities will depend on future
quantities because of the durability of K.
12
Inaddition to the intertemporal conditions, one can derive intrat.emporal first order conditions
whichrelatedurable and non durable consumption as well as consumption and labor supply. The
latter relate the marginal rates of substitution between consumption and leisure (of husband and
wife)tothe real wage and will hold either as equalities if the non-negativity constraints (4) are
not binding or as strict inequalities if those constraints are indeed binding.
(6) UQw' ￿ U,.(.), s1,2
When one has several assets one can model the first kind of liquidity constraint as a limit on
the total net worth:"
(7)
where M is, for the time being, exogenous. The constraint (7) involves a modification of the first
order condition (5) in that one has to consider the possibility that the inequality is binding.
AJ7\rTf 1 i2 v '7 ,vti cCt,,, flt,t —
(5') R+1)1+p1;
if one considers multiple commodities and inflation explicitly, it is possible to derive an Euler
equation for each commodity. The 'real' interest rate relevant for each of these equations will
involve the inflation rate of the relevant price index.
13 We can also consider constraints on single assets. The Euler equation, however, will hold for
those assets that are not subject to the liquidity constraint.
6where p is a Kuhn-Tucker multiplier which is zero if (7) is not binding and is positive when
E'A11=M.If, in addition, one considers asset specific restrictions, one should add to equation
(5') asset specific Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. 14
Severalclarifications are in order. First of all, as noticed by Juster and Shay (1964), Zeldes
(1989) and Runkle (1991), the Euler equation will hold as an equality only for those consumers
for which inequality (7) is not binding. It is obviously possible that the Kuhn- Tucker multiplier
Ptinequation (5') is, when different fromzero,correlated with lagged or current expected income.
However, this is not the only reason why expected income could enter equation (5'). As noted
by Heckman (1974) in response to a paper by Thurow (1969), the life cycle consumption model
does not necessarily predict the lack of correlation between consumption and income growth, if
leisure affects the marginal utility of consumption. It should, therefore, be stressed that the
interpretation of an eventual correlation between consumption and income as a symptom of the
presence of liquidity constraints depends crucially on the assumption that consumption and leisure
are separable in the within period utility function.
It is interesting to note that the presence of liquidity constraints can distort the intratempo-
ral allocation of consumption and leisure. When the amount that can be borrowed depends on
earnings, this is obvious (see Alessie et al. (1989) and Weber (1993)). However, even when this is
not the case it is possible that a household in which either the husband or the wife would be at a
corner in the absence of liquidity constraints, would change its behavior as a consequence of the
inability to transfer resources from the future to the present because of the liquidity constraints.
In other words, that husband or wife might be induced to enter the labor force as a consequence
of the liquidity constraint. 'Thisproposition can be easily proved in a two-period mode] with-
out uncertainty. It is also possible to construct reasonable examples in which this effect can be
important for female labor force participation.
Similar considerations apply to the intratemporal conditions which relate the consumption of
durables and non-durables. As stressed by Jackman and Sutton (1982), Brugiavini and Weber
(1992) and Chah, Ramey and Starr (1991), the effects that liquidity constraints have on the
relationship between durable and non durable consumption are affected on the one hand by the
14Notethat, if the restriction is on net financial wealth and there are at least two assets which
are held in non zero quantities and for which there are no specific constraints, one could eliminate
ffi by taking the difference of equation (5') for the two assets. This fact could be exploited to test
the importance of the Kuh n-Tucker multiplier p.
16Thisobservation is made, in a fairly informal way, by O'Brien and Hawley (1986).
7durability of K and on the other by the fact durables can be collateralized, If the first effect
is stronger (maybe because only a small portion of the durable stock can be collateralized), the
presence of liquidity constraints will distort the intratemporal allocationin favor of non durables,
while the opposite is true when a large part of the stock of durables can be collateralized. The
reason for this result is intuitive. When durables cannot be collateralized they aggravate an eventual
liquidity constraint because they involve an expenditure which does not give rise to consumption
immediately (because of durability) in a period in which the marginal utility of consumption
is unusually high. When durables can be collateralized, however, this alleviates the liquidity
constraint.
If one relaxes the hypothesis of intertemporal separability, as in Meghir and Weber (1993),
other implications of liquidity constraints can be derived. If preferences are defined over several
non durable and non collateralizable commodities, one can exploit the fact that the presence of
liquidity constraints affects intertemporal but not intratemporal first order conditions. Therefore,
the presence of dynamic effects in Euler equations (which could be rationalized by time non sepa-
rability), must be reflected in the intratemporal first order conditions. In addition, if preferences
are not time separable, Meghir and Weber (1993) show that it is possible to identify all the struc-
tural parameters from the int.ratemporal condition. It is therefore possible to test the equality of
the parameter estimates obtained from the intratemporal and from the interternporal first order
conditions.
Why are liquidity constraintsimportant and what aretheir implications?
Thelire cycle -permanentincome model of Modigliani and Srunberg (1954) and Friedman
(1957) was partly conceived as an alternative to the Keynesian consumption function which relates
consumption to current disposable income. The life cycle -permanentincome theory has the
advantage of being conceptually more appealing and seems to be able to explain a number of
empirical puzzles both in macro and micro data, such as the difference between short-run and
long-nm propensity to consume and the difference in saving rates by income classes of white and
black households. The immediate and obvious implication of the theory is that consumption does
not depend on current disposable income and therefore changes in fiscal policy might have very
different aggregate effects than those predicted by the Keynesian model.
Among the first to discuss the effects of capital market imperfections on the aggregate con-
sumption function were Flemming (1973) and Thbin and Dolde (1971). Flemming (1973) clearly
Sargues that the inability to borrow against future income might cause consumption, in the short
run, to depend on current disposable income. However, he stresses that "[tihe aggregate consump-
tion function implied by imperfect capital markets depends on the way in which the distribution
of income deviations generate 'distribution effects'. A simple permanent-income-type distributed
lag consumption function may well fit the data better than any ad hoc alternative not designed to
reflect a specific hypothesis about the distribution of income." (p. 163). He also points out that
the aggregate marginal propensity to consume depends on the proportion of income fluctuations
that are concentrated on people with low levels of assets and for whom it is "virtually impossible
to borrow against future earnings." (p. 166)16
Tobin and Dolde (1971) present a simple life cycle model which is simulated to illustrate
the importance of liquidity constraints for the aggregate effects of fiscal policy. They allow for
individual heterogeneity (in that they consider individuals with different levels of resources) and
conclude that liquidity constraints 'make a difference' (p.135) in that the marginal propensity to
consume out of available resources is much higher than it would be without constraints. They also
study changes in the tightness of liquidity constraints induced by monetary policy. '
Imrohoroglu (1989) assesses the welfare cost of liquidity contraints within the framework of
an equilibrium model with infinitely lived agents. She considers both the case in which agents
are prevented from borrowing and that in which they face different lending and borrowing rates.
She finds that the inability to insure idiosyncratic risk decreases welfare substantially relative
to the case of perfect insurance. Obviously, the magnitude of the welfare loss depends on the
curvature of the utility function and on the variability of the idiosyncratic shocks. She also finds
that introducing the possibility of borrowing, although at interest rates higher than those available
to savers, reduces considerably the welfare loss. 15
Another issue that has received some attention and for which the possible presence of liquidity
constraints is important is that of Ricardian equivalence. In a much quoted article Barro (1974)
claims that government debt should not be considered net wealth as rational dynasties will antici-
Flemming (1973) also discusses some informal empirical evidence on the two issues that he
thinks important: to what extent changes in labor income are related to changes in hours and to
changes in employment and what is the average level of assets that newly unemployed individuals
could use to maintain a certain level of consumption.
Tobin and Dolde (1971) do not consider uncertainty. They model liquidity constraints both
as a difference in lending and borrowing rates and as a limit in the amount it can be borrowed.
' Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) consider the effects on the welfare cost of introducing unem-
ployment insurance in a model with borrowing restrictions. Imrohoroglu, tmrohoroglu and Joines
(1993) consider social security schemes in an 65 period overlapping generations model.
9pate the future taxes necessary to re-pay it; in this respect fiscal policy is neutral. As Tobin (1980)
forcefullystressed, the presence of liquidity constraints might give fiscal policy an important role
in that it provides liquidity constrained households the means by which to move resources from
the future to the present.
Hubbard and Judd (1986) show how liquidity constraints are important for "the welfare costs
of taxation..." and "for the debate over the impact of temporary tax cuts financed by debt." In
particular, with the help of numerical simulations, they show that, in the presence of liquidity
constraints, a reduction in capital taxation and an increase in labor taxation is not necessarily
welfare improving arid that the Ricardian proposition does not necessarily hold. '
Inmy opinion, the main reasons to worry about the presence of liquidity constraints and some
of their implications can be summarized as follows.
(i) In the presence of binding liquidity constraints some individuals will be unable to smooth
consumption over time and therefore the marginal propensity to consume out of available current
resources would be higher than predicted by the life cycle model. This has obvious implications
for the aggregate effects of changes in taxation or, more generally, shocks to disposable income. It
should be clear, however, that even if liquidity constraints are important, there is no stable rela-
tionship between changes in current aggregate disposable income and consumption. The marginal
propensity to consume out of disposable income will depend on the importance and the tightness
of liquidity constraints, on which sectors of the population are affected by the change in disposable
income, and on the timing and sign of the income shock. Miaggregateconsumption function
which ignores these aspects would be inherently unstable.
(ii) Liquidity constraints affect changesinconsumption only if and when they are binding.
The levelsofconsumption, however, will be affected even by non-currently binding constraints.
The severity of liquidity constraints depends on two things: the dynamic behavior ofearnings
and the specification of intertemporal preferences. Theways in which preferences and liquidity
constraints can interplay to affect consumption levels and saving aremany. Impatient consumers
are more likely to be constrained. On the other hand, as stressed by Carroll (1992), consumers with
a strong precautionary motive might be given an additional incentive to save by the impossibility
to borrow in the event of a negative income shock sometime in the future. More generally, both
-Scheinkmanand Weiss (1986) construct a general equilibrium model with borrowing con-
straints which is able to generate a fairly rich dynamics which reproduces some important features
of actual business cycles. They also stress the implications thatliquidity constraints have for the
volatility of asset prices.
10Deaton (1991,1992) and Carroll (1992) stress how the behavior of impatient consumers with strong
precautionary motives is similar to that of liquidity constrained consumers. Impatience prevents
them from accumulating much wealth, on the other hand, prudence prevents them from having
very low (or negative) amounts of wealth.
(iii) The presence liquidity constraints can increase the steady state aggregate saving rate.
Jappelli and Pagano (1994) present an overlapping generation model in which this happens.
(iv) The welfare consequences of liquidity constraints depend on their nature, the extent to
which they are binding, the variability of idiosyncratic shocks and the technology available for
self-insurance.
(v) Once one admits the importance of liquidity constraints, the Ricardian equivalence propo-
sition loses relevance. Indeed, government debt could be a way of transferring resources from the
future to the present, a possibility prevented by the presence of liquidity constraints. The effects
of introducing funded or unfunded social security schemes also depend on the relevance of liquidity
constraints.
(vi) There are two conceptually distinct ways in which liquidity constraints can affect aggre-
gate consumption and saving, both related to the reasons why individuals might want to transfer
resources from the future to the present. On the one hand, young individuals facing steep earning-
age profiles might want to borrow against future earnings. On the other, individuals with low levels
of assets might find it difficult to smooth temporary negative shocks to their earnings during down-
turns of the business cycle. For the purpose of policy analysis, the characterization of preferences
and of the dynamic and stochastic properties of income for various demographic and economic
groups is as important as establishing the study of the financial institutions and arrangements
that characterize different economies. 20
Differences in consumption behavior over time and across countries have often been explained
by the different development of financial markets (Jappelli and Pagano (1989, 1994)). Muetlbauer
and Murphy (1990), Miles (1992), Attanasio and Weber (1994a) all stress the importance that the
process of financial liberalization has had in explaining the increase in the average propensity to
consume in the late 1980s in the UK.2' Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1991) argue that a possible
20 The inability to smooth shocks might not necessarily bean indication of liquidity constraints.
Suppose that a shock affects everybody in the economy exactly in the same fashion and suppose
that there is no technology to transfer resources interternporally. Consumption, in such a situation,
would necessarily absorb the shock. However, in a general equilibrium context, this would be
reflected in a movement in the interest rate.
21 The institutional aspects of theprocess of financial liberalization are discussed in Davies and
11explanation of the high saving rate of Italian households is the scarce development of financial
markets in Italy where even borrowing against real estate is extremely difficult and costly. A
similar explanation has been advanced to explain the high saving rates observed in Taiwan and
South Korea.
The importance of differences in preferences in a stochastic environment is harder to establish.
To give an idea of the problems involved in the next subsection I present some evidence based on
some simulations.
Onthe relevance of liquidity constraints:some simulation evidence
The dynamic problem discussed in section 1l.B does not have an analytical solution unless
one is willing to make very strong assumptions about preferences and the nature of uncertainty. A
closed form solution for consumption, however, would be extremely useful to assess the importance
and likely relevance of liquidity constraints. One would like to establish what kind of mean earning
profiles, earning variability, preferences, and so on, make liquidity constraints likely to be binding
over the life cycle and over the business cycle. The solution that a number of authors have used
is to simulate the model with plausible parameter values. The papers by Deaton (1991), Carroll
(1992) and Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1993) are examples of this. In this subsection I present
the results of some simulations. A complete analysis of how the effects of liquidity constraints
differ with changes in preference and technology parameters is beyond the scope of this paper.
The objective of this section is to characterize the configurations of preferences (and in particular
discount factors and risk aversion parameter), earning profiles and their variabitity, institutional
arrangements and demographic changes that are likely to make liquidity constraints binding. The
simulations derive the optimal consumption rule for a given set of preference and technology
parameters in the a6sence of liquidity constraints. I want to characterize the configurations of
preferences and income profiles under which the solution would need to be changed in the presence
of liquidity constraints. The three main limitations of this analysis are: (i) no attempt is made
to model consumption behavior when liquidity constraints are indeed binding; (ii) labor supply
choices and, therefore, income are considered as exogenous; (iii) the analysis is partial equilibrium
in nature as interest rates are taken as exogenous.
I solve the model using an algorithm developed in Attanasio et al. (1994). The method is
similar to that of Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1992), but is slightly more general in that it allows
Weber (1991).
12for a more flexible income process and preference structure.
I assume that utility is intertemporally separable and that the within period utility function
depends on household consumption. However, I allow the within period utility to depend on the
number of 'adult equivalents' present in the household.
(8) U(C,,N1)=
where C is household consumption and N is the number of adult equivalents. No effort is made
to estimate adult equivalent schemes in a rigorous fashion. N1 is computed counting each adult
beside the head as 0.8, a child between 16 and 17 as 0.6 and each additional child as 0.5. 22
In what follows I simulate the behavior of many identical households with anaverage age-
profile for the number of adult equivalents. I obtain such a profile by first computing the average
number of 'adult equivalents' N in each year-cohort cells and then smoothing theseaverages. The
smoothing procedure involves regressing the year- cohort averages on a third degree polynomial in
age and cohort specific intercepts. 23
The 'household' is assumed to live for 50 years, being 'born' at age 25 and dying with certainty
at age 75. 1 assume that the 'household' receives labor income until age 65 and retirement income
after that. Labor income is given by a deterministic trend 27 and by a stochastic component I4'1.
Thedeterministic component depends only on the educational attainment of the household head
and on his/her age. The stochastic component, consistently with the micro evidence presented by
MaCurdy (1983) and Abowd and Card (1986) is given by the following process:
(10) Alog(W1)= c
where c is normally distributed with variance 24
22 The specification of the utility function inequation (8) is quite restrictive. Attanasio et al.
(1994) implicitely estimate the relevant adult equivalent scheme in that demographic variables
are introduced as determinats of the marginal utilily in the Euler equation and their coefficients
are estimated. The implied age profiles for the effect of demographics on the marginal utility of
consumption estimated by Attanasio et al. (1994) are not qualitatively different from those used
in this paper.
23 Civen the non linearity of the consumption functiona more interesting excercise would be
that of simulating the consumption of households with different adult equivalent age profile and
aggregate their behavior.
24 When 80 the problem has two rather than one state variables. This complicates the
computation of the solution considerably. In what follows, I only report simulations with U =0.
Attanasio et al. (1994) consider the more general case.
13The deterministic component of household income is modeled (up until retirement) as a third
degree polynomial in age and is calibrated for four different education groups using data from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey. After retirement it is equal to a constant calibrated from the same
data. Retirement income is given by the product of the deterministic component and by a the
realization of the random component of income at age 64. After age 64, therefore, there is no
income uncertainty.
The 'pure' discount factor and the real interest rate are fixed at 0.03. The model can be easily
generalized to allow for stochastic interest rates. It should be stressed that the only source of
uncertainty in this mode! i about income. The model is easily generalized to incorporate uncertain
lifetime.It is also possible to allow for stochastic utility and wealth shocks, which could be
interpreted as shocks to health status.
I obtain the solution by backward recursion. Last period consumption function is obtained
from the assumption that the household does not leave bequests. For the remaining periods, the
consumption function is derived from the Euler equation. Because of the non-stationarity of labor
income, I sotve the model, for each age, in terms of the ratio of consumption to current income
Details on the solution method can be found in Attanasio et al. (1994).
I solve the model for four different education groups: high school dropouts, high school grad-
uates, those with some college education and college graduates. Preference parameters are kept
constant across the education groups. Income and family compositions, however, differ. In bgures
I and 2, 1 plot the age profiles for labor income and adult equivalents used in the simulations
for the four education groups. Notice the differences in scale and that both income andfamily
composition profiles are steeper for college educated individuals.
In Figures 3 to 5, I report the results obtained for the four educationgroups for different
values of the coefficients of risk aversion and of income uncertainty. Several featuresemerge clearly
(and not completely unexpectedly) from the simulations.
First, the shape of the consumption age profile reflects that of number of adult equivalents
plotted in Figure 2. In particular, the model is able to generate the hump-shapedconsumption
age profile observed in the data. Because there are differences across educationgroups in the life
cycle pattern of family composition, there will be corresponding differences in thepattern of life
cycle consumption. 2S
26 Indeed,Attanasio et al. (1994) show that some of the differences in the observed consumption
age profiles across education groups are explained by differences in demographic variables. This
14Second, for relatively low values of uncertainty and risk aversion there is a relatively high
demand for borrowing in the early part of the life cycle. This is obviously caused by the desire
to smooth a very uneven income profile. The pattern of family composition reduces1 to a certain
extent, the necessity to borrow against future resources. However, because fatally composition
peaks before income, there will be stilt a strong incentive to transfer resources from the future.
This implies that an eventual liquidity constraint could have potentially strong effects.
Third, increasing the level of uncertainty decreases the desire to borrow. This decrease is
caused by the precautionary motive for saving. For instance, when one compares Figures 3 and
4 one notices that the increase in the standard deviation of income induces a strong reduction in
borrowing in the first part of the life cycle.
In the literature on liquidity constraints it is argued that 'poorer' households (either in terms
of wealth or income) are more likely to be liquidity constrained. While this is plausible, it should
also be considered that lower educated (and therefore 'poorer') households are likely to facegreater
uncertainty in earnings and therefore might have a stronger precautionary motive to save. Notice
that with a 10 %standarddeviation, high school dropouts do not desire to borrow.
Fourth, increasing the coefficient of relative risk aversion, 'y, decreases the incentive to borrow.
Several aspects are at play here. An increase in the coefficient of relative risk aversion will make
the elasticity of substitution in consumption lower. This, per se, constitutes a greater incentive
to smooth consumption and, therefore, to borrow in the first part of the life cycle. On the other
hand, an increase in risk aversion also increases precautionary savings. Finally, an increase in '
accentuatesthe hump induced by demographics on observed consumption expenditure as it 'blows
up' the needs of a larger family. In Figure 5, where the coefficient of relative risk aversion is 4,
there is a further reduction, relative to Figure 4, in the amount borrowed in the first part of the
life cycle.
The evidence presented here is hardly surprising; the aim of the exercise is to quantify the
effects of changes in uncertainty and risk aversion given realistic income and family composition
profiles. I conclude that for low levels of risk aversion and uncertainty, there might be strong
incentives for young individuals to borrow against future earnings. However, these incentives can
be strongly reduced changing these two parameters. An analogous effect can probably be obtained
by considering a StoneGeary within period utility instead of an isoelastic one.
goes some way towards explaining the evidence presented by Carroll and Summers (1991) and
discussed in Section IV
15A few additional caveats need to be mentioned. MI consumption in these simulations is non
durable. The issue of durables, for which credit is usually more readily available, is not addressed.
A fully specified model would consider both durable and non durable expenditure. Furthermore
the model considered in this subsection ignores transaction costs in both changes in asset and
consumption. There is only one source of uncertainty in the model, namely, income uncertainty.
No insurance institutions, such as social security, are considered. Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes
(1993) consider shocks related to health status and some forms of social security
Liquidity constraints: what can we learn from aggregate time series?
Many of the most influential empirical papers on consumption have used aggregate time series
data to test the implications of the life cjrcle- permanent income model.26 The underlying assump-
tion of many of these papers is that a representative consumer maximizes expected utility over a
(possibly infinite) life cycle. Aggregate consumption data are then used to estimate the prefer-
ences of such a consumer and test the overidentifying restrictions of the model. The advantage of
using aggregate time series data is that one can use relatively long sample periods and therefore
circumvent the small T problem discussed in section IV. However, as I have argued elsewhere,'7 it
is easy to construct examples both in which individuals behave according to the life cycle model,
while aggregate data exhibit excess sensitivity and in which the opposite is true. Attanasio and
Weber (1993) show that the use of improperly aggregated data explains the rejections of the oven-
dentifying restrictions implied by the Euler equation for consumption that one typically finds in
aggregate data. 25
The implication of this is that one cannot use aggregate time series data to estimate preference
parameters or to test the validity of the model. A similar argument applies to tests of liquidity
constrains. In a much quoted paper, Campbell and Mankiw (1989) regress aggregate consumption
26 A non-exhaustive list of the most widelyquoted papers that use aggregate time series data
include Hall (1978), Flavin (1981), Hansen and Singleton (1982,1983) Hayashi (1982), Mankiw,
Rotemberg and Summers (1985), Bean (1986), Campbell (1987), Hall (1988), Campbell and
Mankiw (1989).
" Attanasio and Browning (1993).
In Attanasio and Weber (1993) a long time series of UK cross section data is used to generate
1aggregate' time seriss data using different aggregation criteria. The results indicate that when
arithmetic means are used one obtains the same results as in aggregate data, while when theory-
consistent aggregation is used, one does not reject the overidentifying restrictions. For a useful
survey of contributions to the aggregation literature see Stoker (1993).
16growth on aggregate income growth and interest rates and interpret the coefficient on income
growth as the fraction of individuals subject to liquidity constraints. This interpretation is justified
oniy under the following very stringent conditions.
(i) Consumption and leisure are separable in the utility function;
(ii) The fraction of consumers who are liquidity constrained is constant over time;29
(iii) Liquidity constrained individuals always consume their labor income, in both an up-swing and
in a down-swing of the business cycle.
None of these restrictions are realistic or plausible. As a consequence the interpretation of
the empirical findings presented by Campbell and Mankiw (1989) is questionable. For the sanie
reason, a flexible, dynamic, Keynesian consumption function of the kind estimated, for instance,
by Davidson et al. (1978) is unlikely to be useful for policy analysis: an obvious example of Lucas'
(1976) critique. As stressed in the early papers by Tobin and Dolde (1971) and Flemming (1973),
to assess the effect of liquidity constraints on the way aggregate consumption reacts to changes
in income, one must evaluate the distributional effects of various types of shocks as well as the
composition of the population.
This is not to say that the analysis of aggregate time series data on consumption is useless. For
many practical purposes, such as forecasting, a flexible dynamic model is extremely useful. Indeed,
the life cycle theory and a priori knowledge about the existence of binding liquidity constraints
can be useful in the formulation of the econometric specification to be used in estimation and
forecasting.5°
The main innovation of the life cycle model is to treat the allocation of resources over time in
a way similar to the determination of the demand for different commodities given a total amount
of consumption expenditure. Given the amount of theoretical and empirical studies devoted to
aggregation problems in demand analysis, it is interesting to note how the same problems have
received little attention in consumption studies.
Liquidity constraints: what can we learn from micro data?
Above, I sketched some of the implications of the presence of liquidity constraints for micro
29 Or at least varies in a fashion such that the product of the variablepart of liquidity constrained
individuals and of the rate of growth of income is uncorrelated with the instruments used in
estimation.
30 A good example of this practice is thepaper by Blinder and Deaton (1985).
17economic data. In this section, I summarize those implications, discuss some of the existing
literature and present some new empirical evidence. This section is not meant to be an exhaustive
survey. Rather, I want to evaluate critically the most widely cited contributions. I do not dwell
on technical criticisms of the various studies as I want to focus on the main ideas of the tests
for liquidity constraints. One aspect, however, should be mentioned. Most ol these studies use
expenditure on food as a measure of consumption. While this is justified hy the lack (until recently)
of reliable micro data on consumption, one should remember that such a measure is probably not
the most appropriate one. Tojustify its use in the study of intertemporal allocation of consumption,
one must appeal to a number of assumptions which are strongly violated in alt available studies of
demand behavior. Indeed, Attanasio and Weber (1994b) show that the use of food consumption
can lead to very misleading conclusions in the analysis of Euler equations for consumption.
Excess8ens;tivlty of consumption to labor income
By far the most common test of the validity of the life cycle model is that of 'excess sensitivity'
of consumption to expected labor income. Because one of the main implications of the life cycle
model is that consumption should be smoothed, there should not be any relationship between con-
sumption changes and expected current or lagged income, ifconsumption andleisurearcseparable
in the utilityfunction.
Asmentioned above, these issues are not new and go back to the exchange between Thurow
(1969) and Beckman (1974). Nonetheless, several papers have focussed on the excess sensitivity
issue, using h0th aggregate and microeconomic data. Hall and Mishkin (1982), Zeldes (1989),
Altonji and Siow (1987), Runkle (1991) and Keane and Runkle (1992) all use the Panel Survey on
Income Dynamics (PSID),whileLusarcji (1992) uses the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), to
test the hypothesis that consumption changes are related to lagged or expected income. This boils
down to estimating an equation like the following:
(10) AIn(c1,,+1) = 0 + f +fi'àz,ç + 0ir,+1 + O2Wg + Cjti
where f is either a random or a fixed effect reflecting unobserved heterogeneity,r1 is the
real interest rate, ; are demographic variables that might affect the marginal utility ofnon
durable consumption3' and y is either the expected change or the level of lagged income. The
31 With quarterly ormonthly observations it is also useful to allow seasonal dummies to affect
the marginal utility of consumption.
18null hypothesis consideredis that a2 =0.32 Severaleconometric problems are relevant for the
estimationof an equation like (10). The most serious, however is the factthatthe error term r
include expectational errors which are correlated across individuals.33 As a number of authors
have noted (Chamberlain (1984), Hayashi (1987), and Deaton (1992)), the rational expectations
hypothesis does not imply that the cross sectional mean of 4 goes to zero as N goes to infinity.
Only under special assumptions about the nature of the residuals is it possible to get consistent
estimates of the parameters of equation (10) when T,theavailable number of time periods, is fixed.
The number of periods a household stays on a panel is typically not very large: even if the survey
runs for several years, in the presence of household specific flxed effects, it might be difficult to
obtain consistent estimates.
The availability of time series of repeated cross sections (or short panels) presents a possible
solution to these problems. As suggested by Deaton (1985) and Browning, Deaton and Irish
(1985), one can construct synthetk panels that can be used in estimation. The advantage is that
even in the presence of family (orgroup)specific fixed effects one can obtain consistent estimates
because the relevant dimension is the length of the synthetic panel and not the number of periods
a single household is interviewed. Furthermore, even though one works with aggregated equations,
one controls the aggregation process directly in that it is possible to compute cohort averages
of any non linear function of observable variables. Finally, when necessary it is possible to use
complementary data sources.
Most of the papers mentioned above ignore the possibility that leisure and consumption are
not separable in the utility function. However, if this happens to be the case, the marginal utility
of consumption depends on leisure which will therefore enter the Euler equation. The observed
correlation between consumption and income could, therefore, be rationalized on this basis.
The effects that household labor supply might have on measured consumption seem obvious:
going to work and dressing for work involve costs that might be substantial; female labor force
participation is likely to imply the substitution of household production with market goods and
so on. Browning and Meghir (1991), using the British Family Expenditure Survey, present strong
32 Hall and Mishkin (1982) actually estimate an equation for the level rather than the log of
consumption. This follows from their use of quadratic utility.
33 A discussion of several other econometric problems can be found in Keane and Runkle (1992)
and in the discussions of that paper in the same issue of the Journal of Economic and Business
Statistics.
Moffitt (1993) discusses at length the advantages of synthetic panels methods. For the use of
complementary data sources, see Arrellano and Meghir (1992).
19evidence against the hypothesis of separability between consumption and leisure.
A simple test of the separability assumption can be performed as follows. Consider equation
(6) for a =1,2and assume that the marginal utility of the husband's and wife's leisure is log-linear
in the two leisures and consumption, If one takes logs and subtracts one equation from the other
one obtains, for all the households not at a corner:
(ii) tg(w/w2) =a1log(1,)+ a2log(l) ajiog(cg) + fi'Z1 + tst
where Z are observable variables thought to affect the marginal utilities of wife and husband leisure
and ujg reflects unobserved heterogeneity. Notice that this equation holds true for households at
an interior solution regardless of the presence of. liquidity constraints. The hypothesis of weak
separability between consumption and leisure implies n =0.Weak separability is necessary but
not sufficient to guarantee that neither the husband's nor wife's leisure enter the Euler equation
for consumption.35 However, finding that a, is significantly different from zero provides decisive
evidence for the inclusion of labor supply variables in the Euler equation for consumption.
I estimate equation (11) by instrumental variables using an appropriate correction for selectiv-
ity described in Attanasio and MaCurdy (1993) using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey
1980-1990. The specification allows for several family composition variables and a polynomial in
the husband's and wife's age to affect the marginal rate of substitution between the two leisures.36
a is estimated at 0.15 with a standard error of 0.068, which implies a p-value of 0.024. This result
calls for the inclusion of one or more labor supply variables in equation (10).
A number of papers have used synthetic cohort techniques to estimate and test Euler equa-
tions for consumption and to address the issue of excess sensitivity of consumption to income
growth when allowance is made for labor supply (and demographic) effects. Attanasio and Weber
(1993), Attanasio and Browning (1993)and Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1994) using the UK
family expenditure survey show that once labor supply and demographic effects are allowed for, on
quarterly data there is no evidence of excess sensitivity of consumption to income. Attanasio and
Weber (1994b) reach a similar conclusion using data from the US Consumer Expenditure Survey.
It should also be stressed that these studies use comprehensive measures of consumption rather
If consumption affects the marginal utility of husband and wife's leisure in the same way,
i.e. if leisure is weakly but not strongly separable from consumption, 03 =0and yet there is no
presumption that leisure does not enter the intertemporal Euler equation for consumption.
' Details about the estimation methodology, the specification used and the data are available
upon request.
20than food consumption. "
Theavailable evidence on the relationship between consumption and income growth at rela-
tively short frequencies seems to indicate that there is no strong evidence of excess sensitivity of
consumption growth to income changes, once one allows for the effects of demographics and labor
supply on the marginal utility of consumption. This statement, however, while encouraging for
the life cycle model, is not a strong one. It should be stressed once more that the presence of
liquidity constraints implies a violation of the Euler equation only when these are binding. There-
fore, tests based on Euler equations might not be very powerful against this kind of alternatives.
Furthermore, two additional criticisms against this type of evidence might be relevant.
First, it can be argued that introducing in the Euler equation a variety of demographics and
labor supply variables might introduce noise that would reduce the power of excess sensitivity
tests.38 It is also difficult to gauge whether the estimated parameters on demographic and labor
supply variables imply plausible' preference specifications. In other words, as stressed in the
introduction, it is not easy to identify the presence of excess sensitivity of consumption to income
from non separabilities between consumption and leisure.
Second, while the evidence discussed above shows the lack of relationship between changes
in the marginal utility of consumption and expected changes in income at high (business cycle)
frequencies, liquidity constraints and 'excess sensitivity' might be relevant at low (life cycle) fre-
quencies. Carroll and Summers (1991), for instance, estimate age profiles for consumption and
income for different occupational and education groups and different countries and notice that
relatively steeper consumption profiles correspond to relatively steeper income profiles. They in-
terpret this evidence as indicating that 'consumption parallels income', therefore contradicting the
life cycle model.
However, in constructing their cross section profiles, Carroll and Summers (1991) ignore both
demographic and cohort effects. "Theirconclusions are therefore ungranted; while it is true
that college educated individuals have steeper income and consumption profiles, it is also true
"Blundell,Browning and Meghir (1994) and Attanasio and Weber (1994b) address the issue of
aggregation over commodities explicitely.
In particular, if labor supply (and demographic) variables are less affected by measurement
error than income and are correlated with it they might capture most of the correlation between
expected consumption growth and expected income growth. °Inthe presence of strong cohort effects, the cross section profiles that Carroll and Summers
estimate for income and consumption do not correspond to the life cycle profile of any individual
and can be extremely misleading,
21that they typically have children later in the life cycle. Attanasio and Browning (1993) show
how very simple adult equivalent schemes are able to explain the fact that consumption profiles
parallel income profiles. Attanasio et al. (1994) show that preferences estimated on microeconomic
data (using the restrictions implied by Euler equations on quarterly movements) and differences in
demographic profiles, are able to generate the differences in consumption profiles observed in the
actual data across different education groups. Their results are particularly interesting because
there is nothing in the estimation procedure that 'fits' the differences in consumption profiles across
education groups: preferences parameters are assumed to be the same across groups.
The fact that relatively simple and natural modifications of preferences are able to explain in
a very reasonable way one of the alleged implications of liquidity constraints is an example of the
difficulty of testing for the presence of such constraints. One can always introduce some simple
changes of the basic model which could 'fit' the observed facts. This proposition, however, is not
completely empty. For instance, it is not clear that introducing leisure in the expression for the
marginal utility of consumption can explain the observed correlation between expected Income and
consumption. The presence of leisure and demographic variables in the marginal utility does not
necessarily rule out the presence of income in the Euler equation for consumption or explain the
differences in the shape of the consumption age profiles of different education groups.
Distortions tointratemporal first orderconditions
Theutility function in section I1.B includes two kinds of labor, non durable consumption and
services from durables (which are assumed to be proportional to the stock). Such a utility function
can be easily generalized to allow for more commodities, in which case additional intratemporal
first order conditions should be considered. The important thing to notice, however, is that as long
as we consider commodities which are not collateralizable, non durable and at an interior solution,
their marginal rate of substitution has to be equal to their relative price in every period, regardless
of the presence of liquidity constraints. Indeed, I used this fact above to test for weak separability
of consumption and leisure.
However, if one considers commodities that can be used as collateral and that provide services
(through durability) or affect utility (through habit formation) slowly over time, the presence of
liquidity constraints introduces distortions in the intratemporal first order conditions of the kind
discussed above. The question is: can one use these implied distortions to test for the presence of
liquidity constraints. Unfortunately, the answer is in general, no.
22Consider, for example, the case of durables. Under the assumption of no transaction costs,
Chah et al. (1991) derive an expression for the intratemporal first order condition between durables
and non durables which, using the notation of section II, takes the following form:
(10) = -[( +R.1)f+((1 + R)— (1—6)(i + rt+z))pt]
where ?t+ 1 and R.areassumed to be known at time t, R= 1 + R — (1— b)(l + r,41),
1+=1/pt, andis the fraction of durpMes that can be financed.
Equation (10)is the intratemporalfirst orc condition between durables and non durables
and is derived under the assumption of a perfect market in second hand durable goods- The second
term in the square brakets on the right hand side measures the distortion introduced by the liquidity
constraint. This equation can be used to solve for Ptandsubstituted into the Euler equation for non
durable consumption (equation (5')). Therefore, binding liquidity constraints imply the presence
of some function of durable consumption in the Euler equation for non-durable consumption and
the presence of dynamic terms in the intratemporal first order condition between durable and non
durables. With a tight parametrization of the utility function, this proposition could be tested. For
instance, if the within period utility function is separable between durables and non-durables, one
can test the hypothesis that the expected change in the marginal utility of non durable consumption
depends on durables. Such tests, however, rely heavily on the functional form assumed for the
utility function: in the terms of the example just given, the marginal utility of non durables could
be a function of durables and therefore one would not be able to distinguish between the effect of
liquidity constraints and non separability between durables and non durables.4° In other words, an
intratemporal first order condition with binding liquidity constraint is observationally equivalent
to an Euler equation with non separability between durables and non durables.
Chah and al. (1991) use a specification based on separable preferences and aggregate data to
test the proposition that the "long run relationship between durable stocks and non durables flows
ha[s] predictive power for future changes in non-durable consumption." Brugiavini and Weber
(1992) use micro data and identify liquidity constrained individuals by looking at credit denials.
The identification of liquidity constrained and unconstrained individuals from survey questions
allows Brugiavini and Weber to study differences in the intratemporal first order conditions in the
40 The presence of transaction costs in durable expenditure is another difficult and serious issue
that should be addressed in empirical studies.
23two groups. 41
Similar arguments apply to the relationship between labor force participation and changes in
the marginal utility of consumption. As mentioned above, binding liquidity constraints can induce
female (or male) labor force participation. In other words, a wife who in the absence of liquidity
constraints would choose to be at a corner and not supply labor might be induced to participate in
the labor force by the inability to transfer some of her husband's future earnings from the future
to the present.42 Therefore, under liquidity constraints, one should observe a relationship between
consumption growth and past female labor force participation. However, the same relationship
could be justified by the non separability between female leisure and consumption.
From this discussion, one should conclude that it is very difficult to use the theoretical dis-
tortions introduced by the presence of binding tiu.ijdity constraints to intratemporal first order
conditions to test for the presence of such constraints and their relevance. These negative conclu-
sions, however, could be mitigated by the consideration that if one has additional information on
the likelihood that a household is liquidity constrained (either self reported status, or other proxies
based on liquid wealth, likely future earnings and so on) these restrictions could be profitably used.
Surveyqueotions
While one can devise ingenious implications of the presence of liquidity constraints for observed
consumer behavior, a more direct way to assess the relevance of this phenomenon is to rely on survey
questions. This is the direction taken by .Jappelli (1990) who uses the 1983 Survey of Consumer
Finances. The survey contains some questions on the availability of credit. In particular, consumers
are asked whether they were denied credit or if they refrained from demanding it because they felt
they would be denied. Jappelli is therefore able to characterize liquidity constrained households in
various dimensions.
There are advantages and disadvantages in this approach. First, very few data sets contain
the sort of information which is found in the SCF. Furthermore, the SCF, while being extremely
detailed in terms of assets and liabilities, does not contain any information on consumption. There-
fore, it is not possible to characterize differences in consumption behavior by self-defined liquidity
41Lusardi (1992) reports evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey in favor of the
hypothesis of non-separable preferences between durables and non durables.
12 O'Brien and Hawley (1986) includea variable that should measure liquidity constraints in a
female labor force participation equation and find a significant effect. Theirproxy for the severity
of liquidity constraints is based on housing wealth and is somewhat ad-hoc.
24constrained individuals.Finally, itis notclear how reliablethe answers to these sorts of questions
are, Onthepositive side,onecancheck (as.Jappefli does)whether individualswhoare defined
as liquidityconstrained(orlikely tobe so) accordingto someeasily observedvariable (asisdone
inthepapers byJusterand Shay (1964), Zeldes (1989) and Runkle (1991)) declare themselves as
constrained andvice-versa.
Time series variationofcross sectional moments.
In a recent paper, Deaton and Paxson (1993) consider the implications of the life cycle model
and of liquidity constraints for the time series evolution of the cross sectional variance of consump-
tion and income. The idea is simple and clever: given a simple model of intertemporal optimization
and a process generating individual income, th' Jerive the implications for the evolution of the
cross sectional variability of consumption and income over the life cycle. In their empirical exercise
they analyze data from the US, the UKand Taiwan and they conclude that consumption inequality
does increase with age, as predicted by the life cycle model. They also notice that there is '...a
good deal of similarity in the life-cycle evolution of inequality in total income and consumption.
While such a result is consistent with the theory, it also would occurr if consumption were closely
tied to income, as in a model with liquidity constrained consumers"
Two aspects of this approach can be criticized. First, as the authors acknowledge, it is only
possible to derive strong implications for the cross sectional variability for very simple models.
Once one introduces a few complications, such as demographic variables, these implications are
lost. Second, the analysis takes labor supply, and therefore total income, as exogenous. Obviously,
matters are greatly complicated if one considers labor supply behavior.
Borrowing behavior
The presence of liquidity constraints, either as a limit to the amount which is possible to borrow
or as a difference between lending and borrowing rates, obviously affects borrowing behavior. It
seems, therefore, natural to look at data on loans of various kinds (when available) to shed some
light on this issue. Unfortunately, even when this data are indeed available, it is very difficult to
derive from them any inference on the presence of liquidity constraints. The reason is obvious. The
fact that somebody is not borrowing could be because he/she is liquidity constrained or because
he/she does not want to borrow.
Some indirect inference, however, can be drawn if one characterizes borrowers and identifies
25the likely reasons for holding debt. Liquidity constrained individuals are prevented from smoothing
consumption; a necessary condition for a binding liquidity constraint is the desire to move resources
from the future to the present. Therefore, the only households susceptible to liquidity constraints
are those facing a steeply increasing income profile (the young) or those affected by a transitory
and negative shock to earnings.43 However, these are only necessary and by no means sufficient
conditions to observe binding liquidity constraints. It is conceivable, and perhaps plausible, that
young households facing a steeply increasing but highly variable and uncertain earnings profile
might not wish to borrow. Analogously, negative shocks hitting individuals over a business cycle
might be perceived as permanent or, at least, very persistent. Furthermore, these negative shocks
could conceivably increase the conditional variance of future earnings.
Having said this, however, it would be interesting to establish whether the individuals actually
using credit are those that are more likely to use it to smooth consumption, either over the life
cycle or over the business cycle. In this section, 1 provide some descriptive evidence on borrowing
behavior.
In the three panels of Table 1, I report the percentage of households in the CES paying positive
interest charges on three different types of loans. The loans considered are mortgages, vehicle loans
and 'other loans' which include credit cards, bank loans and so on. In the top panel, households are
divided according to the educational attainment of the household head, in the middle one according
to the age of the household head, while in the bottom one according to race or the household head.
From the table, significant and interesting differences emerge. There seems to be a strong positive
correlation between educational attainment and use of loans. In terms of age composition, notice
that the proportion of households with Cother loans' increases sharply during the first age periods
and declines subsequently. A similar pattern is evident for mortgages and (to a lesser extent) for
vehicle loans. Finally, from the third panel it is evident that blacks borrow less often than whites
and other races. To summarize: in my sample lower educated, younger, black households are less
likely, to borrow in any form than educated, middle aged, white families. This result, obviously,
does notnecessarilyimply that lower educated individuals are liquidity constrained.
In Table 2.1, I consider the joint effects of these covariates by estimating a Probit model for
each of the three loans categories considered. Besides the variables whose coefficients are reported
in the table the equations include time dummies.44 These results confirm the evidence presented
These shocks have to be large (in absolute value) relative to the savings of liquidity constrained
individuals.
The incentives to hold loans changed substantially over the sample period as a consequence
26in Table 1. Even when considered simultaneously (and with other controls), the variables discussed
abovehave the same effect onthe likelihood that a household uses credit. In Table 2.2, 1 introduce
variablesmeantto measure business cyclefluctuations,In particular,Iconsider the change in
annualhousehold incomeand two dummies that indicate that the reference person or his spouse
were unemployed in the year preceding the interview.46 Theseunemployment dummies are
negative and strongly significant, while the income decline dummyispositive and significant.
The evidence presented in this section seems to indicate that loans are used more by wealthier
individuals i".Thisevidence is consistent with the hypothesis of liquidity constraints, butisnot
inconsistent with the view that poorer individuals might not want to borrow, rather than their
being denied access.
Liquidity constraints: some evidence on vehicle loans
Introduction
While the descriptive evidence presented at the end of the previous section is not very infor-
mative about the presence of liquidity constraints, data on borrowing behavior and on the interest
paid by borrowers can be used to shed some light on the hypothesis that liquidity constraints are
more likely to be binding for some groups of the population than for others.
if one defines an individual to be liquidity constrained if he/she would like to borrow, at the
current interest rate, more than what he/she is currently borrowing (which might be zero), that
individual's demand for loans should be relatively less sensitive to changes in the interest rate
than for unconstrained individuals. This is because liquidity constrained individuals are at a kink
or, if they face a difference between borrowing and lending rates, on a particularly steep region
of an intertemporal budget constraint. At the same time, they should be more sensitive to the
of the 1986 Tax Reform Act. The deductibility of all interest payments with the exception of
mortgage payments was removed. This created strong incentives, especially for taxpayers in the
highest tax brackets, to switch from other sources of debt to mortgages. Maki (1994a) shows that
these effects were substantial for high income households.
No attempt is made to distinguish between expected and unexpected income changes. "Unfortunately,the survey classifies as 'unemployed' only someone who has been out of work
for 52 consecutive weeks. As a consequence the percentage of unemployed individuals is very low. "Ialso introduced consumption quantiles dummies in the probit equations of Tables 2J and
2.2. The relationship between the level of consumption and the probability of having a loan is
strongly positive. Finally, households which have recently acquired durable commodities are more
likely to use credit.
27availability of loans. Increasesinmaturity for a liquidity constrained individual who is borrowing
the maximum is equivalent to an increase in the amount that is possible to borrow and, therefore,
wouldhavelarger effects than on unconstrainedindividuals.
Ideally,one would like to test such a proposition by measuring how interest rate and maturity
variations are reflected, keeping other things constant, in the amount borrowed by different groups
of individuals. These ideas are far from new; they are discussed and implemented by Juster and
Shay (1964). They construct a survey designed to measure the elasticity of the demand for loans to
interest rate and maturity. Different groups of individuals were confronted with financing packages
(they could either accept or refuse) which differed in interest rate and maturity.
Unfortunately, such a simple scheme is not available for the present investigation. The first and
most important reason is that we do not observe the interest rate and maturity faced by individuals
who do not finance their vehicles, This problem is analogous to participation in a labor supply
equation; typically one does not observe the real wage for non participants. Furthermore, even
restricting the sample to car buyers can introduce biases. It is conceivable that some individuals
faced with a particularly high cost of financing will decide to postpone or forgo the idea of buying
a new vehicle.
In addition, it is likely that the interest rate and the maturity of a financing contract are
endogenous. The terms of a financing contract can depend on the size of the amount borrowed and
different groups might face (maybe because of discrimination from lending institutions) different
interest rates. Furthermore, households with a particular taste for borrowing might be willing
to accept particularly high borrowing rates (or short maturity). Finally, the availability and the
terms of vehicle loans probably depend on various features of which only few are observable by the
econometrician. The ownership of other assets is an example of an observable variable which is
bound to be relevant, while credit history is a relevant variable which is not observable. In what
follows, these endogeneity problems are tackled by the use of instrumental variables techniques.
Portfolio choices for both constrained and unconstrained individuals cannot be described by
simple models. In reality, one observes individuals holding sizable amounts in both liquid and
non liquid assets and, at the same time, liabilities with interest rates well above those earned by
those assets. Besides irrationality, these observations can probably be explained by the liquidity
services provided by the former and by the transaction costs connected with changes in the latter.
Of course these incentives will vary across individuals and over time as a function of the various
interest rates.
28In what follows, rather than specifying a structural model, I estimate a simple statistical
model that takes into account the problems discussed above and allows me to measure some of the
parameters of interest.
A statistical model of vehicle deôt
Because the problem is conceptually similar to a labor supply problem with the possibility
of non participation, I use a similar methodology. As a first approximation I neglect the effect
that the lack of credit availability may have on the decision of purchasing a car and focus on the
subsample of cars buyers. The statistical model I consider is made of two equations. The first
refers to the decision to finance and the second to the amount of the car purchase that is financed.
(11) =8'z+ c
(14) =9z+ iir + 12tn + E[v1 Ic>—S'x4 +u
where I in equation (13) is a latent variable which is positive for consumers who decide to finance
and non positive for those who do not finance, .8 is the share of the car purchase that is financed r
and in; are the interest rate and the maturity of the loan and z is a vector of observable variables.
The vector of observable variables z includes the exogenous determinants of the decision whether
to finance or not. It includes variables such as time and region dummies, demographics and so on.
The dimension of x is greater than or equal to two plus the dimension of z.
Equation (14) models the proportion of a car purchase that is financed (the financing ratio)
conditional on financing. The selection term Ejv1 e >—S'z4term can be modeled in a fairly
flexible way as in Attanasio and MaCurdy (1993). 1 assume that the Ejv I] = L..., a,e.The
conditional moments in (14) are then estimated consistently using the formulae for the truncated
normal.
As discussed above, it is necessary to instrument the interest rate and maturity. (Over-)
identification is achieved using the assumption that time dummies interacted with regional dummies
affect the financing ratio only through the interest rate and the maturity of the loan. It should be
understood, however, that one identifies interest rate and maturity effects only off temporal and
regional variation, which is potentially limited (see Table 3 below).
29I estimate equations (13)and(14) for different groups in the population. While this limits the
variability in interest rates (and therefore the potential efficiency of the estimates) it is fundamental
for our test. It is likely that less educated, younger individuals will be liquidity constraints so that
one should get stronger effects on the interest rate for the more educated, older households and
stronger effects of maturity for younger less educated families.
Several extensions and considerations are possible and/or desirable. First, one should consider
the effects that the lack of borrowing opportunities would have on the decision to buy a car. Second,
it is desirable to control for the effects of variables such as liquid and non liquid (housing) assets
availability both on the decision to borrow and on the amount borrowed. It should be considered
that these variables are endogenous and (especially in the case of liquid assets) determined jointly
with the amount borrowed. A similar argument can be made for other forms of borrowing such
as consumer loans and mortgages. Finally, it is worth investigating the possibility of taking into
account differences in marginal tax rates for different individuals. "
Empiricalevidence
Inwhat follows, I use data on vehicle transactions and on whether a particular purchase has
been financed or not. I also know the terms of the loan (interest rate and maturity), the amount
borrowed, the source of financing and the cost of the vehicle. In addition, I have a substantial
amount of information on family background and on consumption.
focus on the sample of households who have bought an automobile in the twelve months
preceding the last interview. To avoid biasing the sample of borrowers in favor of households with
relatively longer maturity loans, I do not consider purchases made more than twelve months before
the interview and currently financed.
The variable I model is the fraction of the car value which is financed. Some households
purchased more than one automobile within the last twelve months, in this case I consider the
total value of the cars bought and the total amount financed, if more than one car was financed,
the interest rate is a weighted average of the interest rates with weights given by the size of each
loan (as is the maturity of the loan).
The total sample of car buyers is made of 5,242 households of which as many as 12% have
bought more than one car in the year preceding the interview. About 58% of all the households in
s MaId (i994b) presents some evidence along these lines. The interest deductibility has been
progressively eliminated, starting with the 1986 tax act.
30the sample have financed their car purchases.The mean valueof the ratioofthe loan to the value
of thecaris, for households who finance, 075 (standard deviation 0.20), while the median of the
same ratio is 0.78.
There is a considerable amount of heterogeneity in the interest rate and in the maturity of
loan contracts, even within a single year. The effective interest rate, computed by the BLS on the
basis of the terms of the contract, averages 0.1348. Over time, the evolution of the average interest
rate in the sample matches that of the average interest rate on car loans published by the Fed
reasonably well; the correlation coefficient between the two quarterly series is 0.75. Loan maturity
averages at just over 40 months, while the median is 42 months.
In Table 3, 1 report the results of simple regression equations which relate interest rates and
maturity to several household specific variables and to time dummies. " In the first and third
column, the variables included are those that in the next sub-section are treated as exogenous and
included in the instrument set: regional dummies (northeast, midwest, south and west) race dum-
mies (black and non-black), educational attainment of the household head (high school dropouts,
high school graduates, some college and college graduates) and age groups (20-40, 40-55 and 55-
70). In the second and fourth column, I add dummies for the financing source: dealers, financial
institutions, banks, credit unions and others (which include insurance companies, individuals and
others). Because this variable is bound to be endogenous, is not used in the instrument set. The
reference groups are non black, high school dropouts, residing in the west and aged between 20
and 40. The excluded financial institution is the last one ('others').
The interest rates on car loans paid by college graduates seem significantly lower than those
paid by high school dropouts. The difference (in nominal terms) is more than a percentage point.
Thedummies forthe other two education groups are only marginally significant and are one third in
size. The dummy for black households is not statistically significant. The south and the northeast
dummies are statistically significant and negative.
Interest rates depend strongly on the financing source. In particular, loans from credit unions
and 'other sources' are significantly cheaper. The most expensive are those from financial institu-
tions followed by those offered by banks and by dealers. ° The introduction of the dummies for
the financing source do not change significantly the coefficients on the other variables.
There are no visible regional and age effects on maturity. On the other hand, maturity
I do not report the coefficients on the time dummies.
It is possible that dealers offer better terms on interest rates, but worse ones in terms of prices.
31increases with the educational attainment of the household head; the average maturity of the
loan of a household headed by college educated individuals is eight months longer than that of
household beaded by high school dropouts. The maturity of loans originated from 'other' sources
is significantly lower than that from banks, dealers, credit unions or financial institutions. However,
there are no large differences in maturity among these latter sources.
In Table 4, I describe the main features of the sample of the households who financed compared
to those who do not finance. In particular, the table compares educational attainments, assets, and
race composition. The sample of households who finance is slightly better educated, contains less
blacks and is slightly younger. The mean assets of those who finance are lower but, interestingly
enough, the median is higher.
I can now turn to the results obtained estimating equations (13) and (14). For the sake of
brevity! only report the estimates of the key parameters of equation (14), the others are available
upon request.
I estimated equation (14) twice, first with the coefficients on the interest rate and on maturity
contsrairied to be the same for all observations and then allowing them to be different for different
age groups. In equation (14) I introduce several variables that should control for life cycle effects
on the borrowing decision. These include age, education, and race dummies. As discussed above,
interest rates and maturity are instrumented by means of time dummies interacted with regional
dummies. The interest rate is given by the nominal interest rate payed by the household minus
the inflation rate in the CPI at the moment the loan was contracted. All theexogenous variables
are used in the selection equation.
In the first line of Table 5, 1 report the estimates of the coefficients on the real interest rate
and maturity for the restricted equation. The coefficient on maturity is estimated quite precisely
and has the positive sign one would expect under the hypothesis of binding liquidity constraints.
The estimate of the coefficient on the interest rate, on the other hand, is quite imprecise. The
coefficient is negative, but not statistically different from zero. This could be due to a low elasticity
of the demand for loans to the interest rate or to the lack of good instruments.
In the second, third and fourth line of the table, I report the coefficients on the interest rate
and the maturity that one obtains if these variables are interacted with dummies for threeage
groups. The groups I consider are: individuals aged between 20 and 40, 41 and 54 and 55 and
70.51 The coefficient on the interest rate for the second and thirdgroup is negative and, in the 'Itried finer age groups, but the limited size of the sample makes the estimates extremely
32case of the second group, marginally significant.
62Furthermore,the coefficient on maturity for
the middle group is not statistically different from zero. Notice that the middle group is, because
of their position in the life cycle, the least likely to be liquidity constrained.
I redo the same exercise splitting the sample using different criteria, such as the amount of
liquid assets, the educational attainment, and theraceof thehouseholdheads aswell asvarious
interactions of these variables with the age dummies. Unfortunately all these criteria produced
extremely unprecise results, especially in terms of estimates of the interest rate elasticities. These
results are not reported but are available upn request.
Overall I conclude that there is some indication that the demand for loans of the middle
aged group is more sensitive to changes in the interest rate than that of the other groups and, in
particular, of the youngest. Furthermore, there is some evidence that this same group is much less
sensitive to changes in the maturity of the loan.
These results constitute a first step in understanding the possible role of liquidity constraints
and in the use of debt data to assess their importance. There is, however, much room for improv-
merit. Several issues are important. First, it is important to find more efficient instruments and/or
larger samples so as to measure with greater precision the interest rate elasticity of the demand
for loans. Second, the exercise performed above controls for, but does not model, a substantial
part of the effect that interest rates have on the demand for loans; i.e. the effect on the decision to
finance or not. The selection equation (13) is a reduced form equation in which the interest rate
has been substituted out. Without a structural model and an interest rate equation, the effect that
the interest rate has on the decision to finance cannot be measured. Finally, I have analyzed only
loans linked to the purchase of vehicles, which are highly collateralized. It would be interesting to
study other forms of consumer debts.
Conclusions
In this paper I have analyzed the issue of liquidity constraints and their relevance for consump-
tion behavior. The first message of the paper is a negative one; one cannot use macroeconomic
data to establish the relevance of liquidity constraints. Furthermore, the implications of binding
liquidity constraints for the behavior of aggregate data are far from straightforward
noisy.
62Aformal test rejects (marginally) the hypothesis that the coefficient on the interest rate in
the first and second group are the same.
33Establishing the empirical relevance of liquidity constraints is equivalent to determining the
opportunity set available to an individual in an intertemporal optimization problem. It is extremely
hard to distinguish hypotheses on opportunity sets from hypotheses on preferences without strong
identifying and, therefore, untestable assumptions. Many of the implications that one can de-
rive from the presence of binding liquidity constraints are also consistent with somewhat plausible
preference specifications. The most obvious example is the correlation between expected con-
sumption and income growth. This could be an indication of binding liquidity constraints or of
non-separability between consumption and leisure in the utility function. On the other hand, it
is possible that the only preference specifications consistent with the observed data implies highly
implausible parameter values so that they could be ruled out on an a priori basis
These difficulties apply to the study of both intertemporal and intratemporal first-order con-
ditions. Intratemporal first-order conditions are unaffected by the presence of liqudity constraints
as long as they involve commodities whose contribution to utility is intertemporally separable and
for which an interior solution is relevant. On the other hand, the presence of liquidity constraints
distorts the intratemporaj first-order conditions for commodities (such as leisure or durables) for
which corners and some form of intertemporal non separability are relevant. However, the impli-
cations that one can derive from this kind of analysis can also be rationalized by some form of
non-separability in preferences.
The nature of the difficulties discussed so far make additional information, such as the self re-
ported status contained in some surveys, extremely helpful. The caveat, of course, is the availability
and reliability of such questions concerning liquidity constraints.
The conclusion that one can draw from the discussion on the use of micro data is that, without
a priori information on the structure of preferences (and/or opportunity sets), it is extremely diffi-
cult to use data on household consumption behavior to detect thepresence of liquidity constraints.
In the last part of the paper, I argue that data on debt can be useful to establish the empirical
relevance of liquidity constraints. This is not aneasy task. In the last section, 1 propose a simple
exercise that can shed some light on the issue. More can be learned by specifying a structural
model, possibly to be estimated using similar data.
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Proportion of households paying positive Interest
by education attaiaptent
Vehicle loans Mortgages Other Loans
High School Dropouts 0.243 0.320 0.408
High School Graduates0.344 0.486 0.561
Some College 0.380 0.561 0.652
College Graduate 0.391 0.845 0.637
by age group
C25 .0.354 0.226 0.543
25-30 0.396 0.435 0.631
31-35 0.381 0.587 0.671
36-40 0.372 0.661 0.666
41-45 0.397 0.698 0.665
46-50 0.418 0.634 0.616
51-55 0.361 0.580 0.586
56-80 0.316 0.458 0.471
61-65 0.227 0.310 0.385
66-70 0.146 0.220 0.297
by race
white 0.350 0.530 0.580
black 0.283 0.357 0.506
other 0.367 0.506 0.532table 2.1
Probit model for positive interest payments
Car Interest Mortagage Other
HighSchool Dropouts -.267 -.661 377
(.029) (.028) (.027)
High School Graduates-.065 -.324 -.log
(.024) (.024) (.024)
Some College -.010 -.170 .064
(.025) (.026) (.064)
25-30 .088 .557 .215
(.050) (.053) (.049)
31-35 .044 .942 .322
(.049) (.052) (.048)
36-40 .020 1.156 .318
(.049) (.053) (.049)
41-45 .093 1.273 .328
(.050) (.054) (.050)
46-50 .167 1.140 .225
(.051) (.055) (.051)
51-55 .025 1.011 .153
(.052) (.055) (.051)
56-60 -.076 .745 -.104
(.052) (.055) (.051)
61-65 -.341 .358 -.315
(.053) (.055) (.051)
66-70 -.634 .112 -.535
(.056) (.057) (.052)
black -.156 -.373 -.133
(.030) (.030) (.029)
other .011 -.137 -.167
(.048) (.049) (.048)
Note: Standarderrora Os parent heats.Table 2.2
Probit model for positive Interest payments
Car Interest Mortagage Other
High School Dropout.-.312 -.735 ...339
(.018) (.017) (.024)
High School Graduates-.052 -.284 -.084
(.024) (.013) (.014)
Some College -.011 -.164 .023
(.014) (.014) (.022)
31-35 -.043 .428 .061
(.016) (.016) (.026)
36-40 -.039 .632 .065
(.017) (.01?) (.026)
41-45 .042 .754 .056
(.018) (.018) (.027)
46-50 .077 .606 -.018
(.019) (.019) (.028)
51-55 -.030 .502 -.055
(.019) (.019) (.028)
black -.168 -.488 -.166
(.018) (.017) (.025)
other -.014 -.245 -.171
(.028) (.028) (.040)
Reference Person -.294 -.228 -.133
Unemployed in (.025) (.021) (.022)
Last 12 Months
Spouse -.049 .028 -.129
Unemployed in (.039) (.036) (.045)
Last 12 Months
Dropin Family -.047 0.006 1.266
Income over Last (.014) (.015) (.017)
12 Months
Note:Standsrd errors in parentheses.Table 3
Interest rate and maturity of car loans
Pep. Var. bit. Rate mt. rate maturity maturity
black 0.0018 0.0015 -1.4726 -1.7940
(0.0030) (0.0030) (1.0147) (0.9990)
high Sc. -0.0048 -0.0047 4.2850 4.0217
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.8707) (0.8567)
somecoil. -0.0048 -0.0046 6.4398 6.2113
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.9100) (0.8959)
college -0.0131 -0.0128 8.1335 7.8137
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.9177) (0.9071)
northeast -0.0047 -0.0083 0.2888 -0.6537
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.8809) (0.8725)
midwest 0.0001 -0.0010 -0.5800 -1.2102
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.7991) (0.7891)
south -0.0049 -0.0058 -1.1038 -1.4559
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.7688) (0.7578)
40-55 0.0009 0.0010 -0.6631 -0.7352
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.6264) (0.6160)
55-75 -0.0026 -0.0024 -0.1088 -0.1589
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.8240) (0.8098)
dealers - 0.0097 - 11.084
- (0.0035) - (1.1911)
financial - 0.0135 - 11.506
institut. - (0.0040) - (1.3690)
banks - 0.0118 - 11.475
- (0.0033) - (1.1324)
credit - 0.0029 - 9.503
unions - (0.0036) - (1.2311)
adj.R2 0.055 0.0625 0.0487 0.0829
se. 0.0432 0.0430 14.86 14.59
Mean 0.1356 0.1356 39.75 39.75
Observations 2878 2878 2878 2878
Note Standard errors in parenthesis.Table 4













Some coil. 0.26 0.23
College 0.24 0.21
Note: standard errors in parenthesis
Table 5
Interest rate and maturityelasticityof financing ratios
Real
Interest Rate Maturity






55 S age 5 70 -0.48i 0.0060
(1.142) (0.0035)
Note: standard errors in parentheses.let Sicitlonroup
Figure 1
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